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Democracy as Problem Solving: Campaign




Alone among the current Justices of the United States Supreme
Court, Justice Stephen Breyer has attempted to develop a fresh direction
for campaign finance jurisprudence. Other Justices have positioned
themselves on one side or the other of the traditional line drawn by
Buckley v. Valeo' as either more or less inclined to sacrifice speech for
the "integrity of the electoral process." 2 For example, Justice John Paul
Stevens has succinctly stated, "[m]oney is property; it is not speech."3
However, Stevens has left it there, more epigram than program. Breyer
suggests a better way of looking at the issue. He is the architect of a
judicial strategy of broad deference to the legislature in the review of
campaign finance regulation; however, that is the outcome, not the start-
ing point, of his project.'
Breyer's larger aim is to defend the concept of "active liberty,"
which he locates at the very "core" of the constitutional conception of
the democratic form of government.' In a significant bid to establish it
as the organizing principle for a comprehensive jurisprudence, Breyer
has introduced his theory of active liberty in a series of lectures,6 a law
review article,7 and a full-length book.8 In his exposition of active lib-
erty, Breyer draws on campaign finance regulation to illustrate the posi-
tive application of active liberty to the adjudication of First Amendment
cases. In this way, Breyer invites us to consider the assumptions under-
* Robert F. Bauer is a partner with the law firm Perkins Coie, L.L.P., and is the Chair of its
Political Law Group.
1. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
2. Id. at 10.
3. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 398 (2000) (Stevens, J., concurring).
4. See id. at 399-405 (Breyer, J., concurring).
5. Stephen Breyer, Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the United States, Harvard Tanner
Lectures on Human Values 2004-2005: Our Democratic Constitution (Nov. 17, 18, and 19, 2004)
(transcript available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/speeches/sp-11-17-04.html)
[hereinafter Tanner Lectures].
6. See id.
7. See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, Our Democratic Constitution, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 245 (2002).
8. STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION
(2005) [hereinafter ACTIVE LIBERTY].
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lying his notion of active liberty-assumptions about speech, participa-
tion, and the democratic process. 9 Furthermore, Breyer endeavors to
explain how his theory of active liberty leads to the result he favors-a
campaign finance jurisprudence that exercises wide deference to the
legislature.
Breyer argues that his rationale favors "participatory self-govern-
ment."' ° Understood in these terms, it seems well-suited to the purpose
of campaign finance regulation: to control political money and thereby
provide for a political process less susceptible to special interest influ-
ence and more open to broad public participation. On closer examina-
tion, however, there is reason to doubt that this is the dominant concern
behind either active liberty or its application to the review of campaign
finance regulation.
Active liberty captures a career-long concern of Breyer, one that he
developed in writing as both an academic and as an appellate judge.
More specifically, Breyer's concern is with the efficacy, not the demo-
cratic legitimacy, of government decision-making. Breyer hopes to con-
nect the two by suggesting that democratic decision-making is all the
more participatory if it is effective. The question is whether he has suc-
cessfully demonstrated the point.
It has been suggested that, unlike the "'egalitarian influence'"
rationale for campaign finance regulation, which imposes a particular
"'vision of good government,'" Breyer's "self-government" rationale
"does not entail governmental promotion of better or worse visions of
democracy, but governmental preservation of the essential premise of
democracy itself."" However, this characterization of Breyer's theory
is dubious, as the meaning of "essential premise of democracy itself" is
open to dispute. Therefore, like the "egalitarian influence" rationale,
Breyer's rationale may also impose a particular "vision of good govern-
ment." Breyer' s view of regulation, as it is measured by the standards of
active liberty, is not devoid of political content. In fact, although
Breyer's conception of active liberty is embedded firmly in a particular
substantive vision of good government, it is neither incontestable nor
free of political assumptions and implications.
II. THE NATURE OF ACTIVE LIBERTY
Citing to the French political philosopher Benjamin Constant,
9. Id.
10. Id. at 46.
11. Richard H. Pildes, The Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics, 118 HARV. L. REv.
28, 150 (2004) (emphasis added) (quoting Kathleen M. Sullivan, Political Money and Freedom of
Speech, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 663, 680 (1997)).
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Breyer defines active liberty as a constitutional right to "an active and
constant participation in collective power."' 2 Through an emphasis on
active liberty, "better law" will emerge to help "a community of individ-
uals democratically find practical solutions to important contemporary
social problems."' 3 The emphasis here is on the "practical conse-
quences" of constitutional doctrine,' 4 providing support for "a govern-
ment committed to democratic principle that would prove practically
workable and that also, as a practical matter, would help protect individ-
uals against oppression."' 5 Therefore, active liberty must be pursued
with due regard for "negative liberty," the protection of the individual
from state-imposed restrictions on individual rights, such as speech
rights. However, in arguing for a constructive combination of the two
liberties, Breyer insists on placing the emphasis on the active version of
liberty. 6
Breyer's preference for active liberty is clear from his discussion of
its historical sources. He argues that the Constitution was molded with
the notion of active liberty very much on the drafters' minds. From their
early experience with government, the drafters understood the impera-
tive of making democracy "workable," and not merely responsive to the
will of the people.17 In light of this history, and critical to his argument,
Breyer sees a connection between democracy and workability. Because
the Constitution was written to achieve a "workable democracy," atten-
tion to practicality-"accommodating, even insisting upon, these practi-
cal needs"-is not merely a governing objective, but a democratic one
demanding attention from the judiciary in interpreting constitutional
text. 8
The active quality in this form of liberty is a "source of judicial
power," to be exercised in favor of legislative judgments about the req-
uisite regulation for the democratization of politics.' 9 However, it also
operates as a "restraint on judicial power. '2 0 In this regard, the judiciary
yields to legislative expertise in such matters, but does so only in the
simultaneous exercise of its independent "source of judicial power," and
12. Tanner Lectures, supra note 5.
13. ACTIVE LIBERTY, supra note 8, at 6.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 27-28.
16. Tanner Lectures, supra note 5.
17. ACTIVE LIBERTY, supra note 8, at 23-28. Breyer writes of the Framers' intent "to create a
form of democratic government likely to escape those tendencies to produce ... self-destructive
public policies . . . a form of democratic government that could produce legislation that would
match the needs of the nation." Id. at 28.
18. Id. at 34.
19. Tanner Lectures, supra note 5.
20. ACTIVE LIBERTY, supra note 8, at 6.
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as "actors in the deliberative process" which is the goal of participatory
self-government.2 ' Upon concluding that the Constitution is a veritable
"blueprint" for active liberty, the judiciary may, through the act of defer-
ence, empower the legislature to promote it.22 As such, the judiciary and
the legislature work jointly to shape an informed dialogue among citi-
zens about the formation of public policy.
The notion of expertise plays a large part in the active conception
of democratic politics. The judiciary contributes its overarching inter-
pretation of the constitutional requirements of democratic governance
while the legislature, expert in political realities, establishes a regime of
controls needed to preserve public participation in politics. 23 Under this
model, even the participating citizenry are assumed to study hard for
their role and to participate in the dialogue on an informed basis.24
In matters of campaign finance, the legislature may properly take
into account the increased cost of politics, which results in the dominant
role of large contributors and thereby causing "the public [to] lose confi-
dence in the political system and become less willing to participate in
the political process. 25 Controls placed on political money serve to
democratize political endeavors, "thereby building public confidence in
[the electoral] process, broadening the base of a candidate's meaningful
financial support, and encouraging greater public participation. '"26 In
this state of affairs, public participation seems to consist of access to an
"open public political conversation" and an "exchange of information
and ideas. 27 It is this informed participation by the citizenry that will
enhance the prospects for an informed public policy. 28 The legislature,
''comparatively expert" in the politics of money and its effects on public
trust in government, may therefore act to facilitate such an informed
conversation. 29
III. ACTIVE LIBERTY AND BREYER'S CONCEPTION OF
RATIONAL GOVERNMENT
In Active Liberty, Breyer concludes his discussion of the First
Amendment by stating: "The active liberty reference helps us to pre-
serve speech that is essential to our democratic form of government,




25. ACTIVE LIBERTY, supra note 8, at 44-45.
26. Id. at 47.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 49.
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while simultaneously permitting the law to deal effectively with such
modern regulatory problems as campaign finance and product or work-
place safety."3 The Justice treats here, as members of the same class of
"modem regulatory problems," campaign finance and product or work-
place safety. Breyer has suggested that his theory of judicial review of
regulatory activity is a "general form of analysis" that may be applied to
a wide range of problems.3' How he views the solution of "modem
regulatory problems" bears directly, then, on his analysis of the constitu-
tional theory at work in the application of "active liberty" to campaign
finance regulation.
A. Breaking the Vicious Circle
Although Breyer has written at length about these views in numer-
ous books32 and articles, of particular import is Breaking the Vicious
Circle, in which he critiques the contemporary regulatory regime.
As one commentator has noted, Breyer's approach has been one
"advocating more science and less politics" in the diagnosis and treat-
ment of regulatory problems.33 The vicious circle that Breyer identifies
is formed by a circuit of misinformation and mismatch beginning with
an ill-informed public, proceeding to a politically-motivated legislature
chronically oversensitive to public pressure, and ending with a bureau-
cracy acting on uncertain science. 34 Breyer suggests that the solution
may lie in an elite corps of experts in the executive branch.35 Such a
group of experts, trained in science, economics, and administration, may
apply its expertise with full authority while being insulated from politi-
cal pressures.36 At the time of writing Breaking the Vicious Circle,
Breyer was concerned with competent and rational decision-making in
an "era of political fragmentation, 37 for the benefit of a public broadly
distrustful of expertise, but also lacking data or the means to weigh it in
making technical judgments about regulatory risk.3 8 This trust, Breyer
insists, can only be restored by equipping the government to do its job
well through the recruitment, empowerment, and protection from politi-
cal pressure of an apolitical cadre of experts.
30. Id. at 55.
31. STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK
REGULATION ix (1993) [hereinafter BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE].
32. See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM (1982); BREAKING THE
VICIOUS CIRCLE, supra note 31.
33. Lisa Heinzerling, Political Science, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 449, 450 (1995) (book review).
34. BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE, supra note 31.
35. Id. at 59-61.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 80.
38. Id. at 36.
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Breyer's concern with expertise is directly related to his insistence
on respect for facts and for close empirical study of social or economic
problems. Writing with admiration of Justice Louis Brandeis' passion
for facts, Breyer reaffirms the "lasting truth[ ]," demonstrated in Bran-
deis' writing, that the legislature has a "comparative advantage when it
comes to investigating the facts, understanding their relevance, and find-
ing solutions ...."I'
This is the route by which Breyer arrives at his preference for def-
erence to legislatures in seeking solutions to regulatory problems. Leg-
islatures possess expertise that the judiciary lacks and can investigate
facts to fashion acceptable solutions.40 The judiciary must respect this
capacity while keeping it within constitutional bounds. According to
Breyer, "[t]he job of the Court is to keep legislatures on the Constitu-
tional rails, deferring to legislators' judgments whenever fundamental
individual liberties are not seriously threatened."4
In his discussion of risk regulation in Breaking the Vicious Circle,
Breyer determines that rational collection and assessment of certain
types of regulatory problems require expertise.42 He recognizes that
while the goal of a rational assessment of the facts may be required in
the treatment of all regulatory problems, the means by which it is met
will have to differ.43 So Breyer suggests that an elite corps of civil ser-
vants is needed for the treatment of certain regulatory problems, 44 those
of risk regulation, which Congress is ill-suited to manage directly.45
This capacity for rational policy-making, informed by expertise,
appeals to Breyer.46 Above all, in his quest for a resolution of regulatory
problems, Breyer seeks the application of reason. He highlights for his
reader this statement of Justice Brandeis in New State Ice Co. v. Lieb-
mann: "But, in the exercise of this high power [of judicial review], we
must be ever on our guard, lest we erect our prejudices into legal princi-
ples. If we would guide by the light of reason, we must let our minds be
39. Stephen Breyer, Justice Brandeis as Legal Seer, 42 BRANDEIS L.J. 711, 718 (2004).
40. ACTIVE LIBERTY, supra note 8, at 49.
41. Justice Brandeis as Legal Seer, supra note 39, at 718.
42. ACTIVE LIBERTY, supra note 8, at 61-62.
43. Id. at 62.
44. Id. at 59.
45. Id. at 42, 57.
46. Breyer notes, among the "truths" established by Brandeis' work, the "democratic
preference for solutions legislated by those whom the people elect." Justice Brandeis as Legal
Seer, supra note 39, at 717-18. But this is the last in the series of truths he cites, independent of
the autonomous basis for deference in the legislature's fact-finding capacity, even as he
acknowledges that the Court must examine legislative behavior for signs of self-interested
conduct. Id.
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bold."4"
This broad theory of regulation, or of the role of the judiciary in
aiding competent regulatory measures, has shaped Breyer's specific
positions on various questions of administrative law. These merit con-
sideration, as they bring out in clear terms the consistency and strength
of his convictions leading to his development of the concept of active
liberty. In writing about judicial review of administrative agency action,
Breyer has addressed the distinction drawn between questions of law
and questions of policy, examining what he believes to be the peculiar
view that courts should defer to agencies on matters of law while sec-
ond-guessing them on judgments of policy.48 Breyer states that ques-
tions of law should be reviewed by a flexible standard, with attention to
solving the particular problem in any given case; he does not believe that
it is efficient or sensible to allow disputes over "trivial" points of law to
stand in the way of prompt resolution.49 Remanding an issue for agency
analysis can become a mere waste of time, adding to a proceeding
"unnecessary lapses of delay, complexity and procedure."5 On the
other hand, a question of policy is best left to an agency, which has a
keener appreciation for reaching compromise among various interest
groups such as suppliers, consumer groups, industry representatives, and
even politicians.5"
Therefore, for Breyer, the question faced by the courts is how to
fulfill the judicial function in a way that "will lead to better administra-
tive policy."52 Judges need to help administer a rational, efficient pro-
cess that taps into expertise where it is to be found. Judges can make
judgments in cases; agencies are far better positioned to determine the
direction of regulatory policy.
This perspective also accounts for Breyer's defense of the uses of
legislative history.53 Taking as the point of departure the proposition
that "appellate courts are in part administrative institutions that aim to
help resolve disputes,"54 Breyer sweeps past the theoretical concerns
about the reliability of legislative history as a guide to congressional
intent, and defends it in simple terms as a useful tool:
47. Id. at 717 (emphasis added) (quoting New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311
(1932)).
48. See Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REv.
363 (1986).
49. Id. at 380-81.
50. Id. at 377.
51. Id. at 389.
52. Id. at 390.
53. See Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S.
CAL. L. REV. 845, 861 (1992).
54. Id. at 847.
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[O]ne should recall that legislative history is a judicial tool, one
judges use to resolve difficult problems of judicial interpretation. It
can be justified, at least in part, by its ability to help judges interpret
statutes, in a manner that makes sense and that will produce a worka-
ble set of laws.55
B. Breyer's Judging: The First Amendment and Campaign Finance
Breyer consistently has suggested that his theory of judicial partici-
pation in the performance of the regulatory state may be widely applica-
ble beyond the types of public health risks that absorb his attention in
Breaking the Vicious Circle. For example, as a Supreme Court Justice,
he has introduced these considerations into his decisions, most promi-
nently in Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC.56 In an opinion
authored by Justice Souter, the Court upheld the constitutionality of dol-
lar limits imposed by the State of Missouri on contributions to state and
local candidates.57 Breyer joined the majority, authoring a concurrence
in which he discussed the role of active liberty in shaping the Court's
First Amendment jurisprudence.58
Specifically, Breyer noted that competing constitutional considera-
tions lie on both sides of the issue before the Court: on the one side, a
concern with restrictions on speech, but on the other, a concern with
protecting "the integrity of the electoral process. '59 When confronted
with a regulatory problem, the legislature should not be denied the tools
for finding a solution, particularly where, as in the field of electoral law,
the legislators possess an experience and understanding not available to
judges.6" In this case, the legislature was the expert.6 1
Breyer's characterization of the problem faced by the legislature is
essential in understanding the analysis he chose to apply to the campaign
finance issue in Nixon. Specifically, the analysis applied is the same one
that he advocated in Breaking the Vicious Circle and other writings. In
Nixon, Breyer notes that controls on political money aim to democratize
the influence that money itself may bring to bear upon the electoral pro-
cess, thereby protecting its integrity from the corruptive effect of private
money.62 For Breyer, this protectionist feature comprises "the means
55. Id. at 867.
56. 528 U.S. 377 (2000).
57. Id. at 382.
58. See id. at 399-405 (Breyer, J., concurring).
59. Id. at 401.
60. Id. at 402.
61. Id. at 403-04.
62. Id. The problem "arises out of the explosion of campaign costs." ACTIVE LIBERTY, supra
note 8, at 43. These facts present the problem of public confidence and participation in the
political process, for which the legislature should have the room to devise a solution.
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through which a free society democratically translates political speech
into concrete governmental action."63
Breyer relied on this larger concern for a workable government in
the majority opinion in Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Com-
mittee v. FEC,4 another campaign finance case. In writing for the
majority, Breyer stated that parties could spend without limit for their
candidates when doing so "independently" of them.65 Breyer wrote of
free political speech as an instrument for the accomplishment of success-
ful governance, noting:
A political party's independent expression not only reflects its mem-
bers' views about the philosophical and governmental matters that
bind them together, it also seeks to convince others to join those
members in a practical democratic task of creating a government that
voters can instruct and hold responsible for subsequent success or
failure.
66
Here, Breyer once again links democratic governance with practicality,
appearing to construe the constitutional law in favor of the parties in
service to the "practical democratic task" in which he believes them to
be engaged.67
These campaign finance cases indicate a doctrinal progression in
the Court's campaign finance jurisprudence towards a notion of active
liberty. Whereas prior campaign finance jurisprudence was more ori-
ented toward the protection of negative liberty, more recent case law
suggests a sharp turn in the opposite direction towards active liberty,
with Breyer at the helm. 68 However, Breyer's focus on active liberty
has not only affected his campaign finance jurisprudence, but it also has
shaped his broader First Amendment jurisprudence, as he makes clear in
Active Liberty.69
One such example, emphasized by Breyer in his discussion of the
operation of active liberty in the realm of the First Amendment,7 ° is his
dissent in Thompson v. Western States Medical Center.71 Notwithstand-
ing the fact that Thompson involved commercial rather than campaign-
related speech, Breyer endeavored to show how his notion of active lib-
63. Nixon, 528 U.S. at 401.
64. 518 U.S. 604 (1996).
65. Id. at 608.
66. Id. at 615-16 (emphasis added).
67. See id.
68. Breyer's First Amendment jurisprudence has drawn fire from negative liberty advocates.
See, e.g., Lillian R. BeVier, The First Amendment on the Tracks: Should Justice Breyer Be at the
Switch?, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1280 (2005).
69. ACTIVE LIBERTY, supra note 8, at 39-55.
70. See id. at 41.
71. 535 U.S. 357 (2002).
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erty, as focused on the encouragement of democratic participation,
would help clarify the issues for decision.
The plaintiffs in Thompson, licensed pharmacies specializing in
compounding drugs, challenged the constitutionality of a federal statu-
tory prohibition on advertising the availability of such drugs under the
First Amendment.72 The Court held that the prohibition failed First
Amendment review.73 Breyer dissented, arguing that the restriction at
issue did not present a threat to the "functioning of democratic
processes" but instead reflected an example of commercial speech regu-
lation, "a democratically determined governmental decision" to protect
the consumer. 4
Later commenting on the case during a lecture at Harvard Univer-
sity, Breyer maintained that the First Amendment should not bar legisla-
tion that regulates speech for sound reasons based on the evaluation of
facts such as "the existence of widespread prescription drug advertising,
[and] the medical belief that . . . advertising pressures physicians into
prescribing drugs they would not ordinarily prescribe. 75 Based on the
evidence presented, Breyer concluded that Congress could reasonably
find that these restrictions were justified by their broad regulatory goals,
and that "a contrary view of the First Amendment standard ... impedes
• . . the workings of a democratically determined economic regulatory
system. 76
Likewise, Breyer's concurrence in Bartnicki v. Vopper7 7 illustrates
his care in avoiding sweeping construction of First Amendment protec-
tions that would thwart effective government action. The case involved
the application of federal and state wiretapping statutes to media defend-
ants charged with the receipt, transmission, and eventual publication of
an intercepted cellular communication between a union negotiator and a
union official during a labor dispute.78 Citing the public interest in the
subject matter, the Court held that the First Amendment barred the appli-
cation of the law.79 In concurring, Breyer wrote to express his reserva-
tion about implying a "significantly broader constitutional immunity for
the media," emphasizing that his position rested on the unique facts of
the case.80 It was his principal concern to caution against any broader
72. Id. at 360.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 388 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
75. Tanner Lectures, supra note 5 (internal citations omitted).
76. Id. at 16; see also AcTIVE LIBERTY, supra note 8, at 51-54.
77. 532 U.S. 514 (2001).
78. Id. at 517-18.
79. Id. at 535.
80. Id. at 536 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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rule of decision that would hamper "legislative flexibility" needed "to
respond.. . to the challenges future technology may pose to the individ-
ual's interest in basic personal privacy.""8
From these cases, it is clear that Breyer pays close attention to what
he believes to be the constitutional questions on both sides of First
Amendment claims raised against government regulatory action. "[I]f
strong First Amendment standards were to apply across the board," he
has written, "they would prevent a democratically elected government
from creating necessary regulation."82 This would "unreasonably limit
the public's substantive economic (or social) regulatory choices" and
would "likely exceed what any liberty-protecting framework for demo-
cratic government could require, depriving the people of the democrati-
cally necessary room to make decisions, including the leeway to make
regulatory mistakes."83
Breyer finds the appropriate test by which the courts have guided,
and should continue to guide, their decisions in this area to be what he
refers to as "one of proportionality." 84 He describes it as follows:
Does the statute strike a reasonable balance between electoral speech-
restricting and speech-enhancing consequences? Or does it instead
impose restrictions on speech that are disproportionate when mea-
sured against their electoral and speech-related benefits, taking into
account the kind, the importance, and the extent of those benefits, as
well as the need for the restriction in order to secure them?85
In other words, the state's regulatory program, as reflective of the pub-
lic's substantive economic (or social) regulatory choices, is balanced
against the protection of individual speech rights. The sword is poised
against the shield. As Breyer sees it, the successful management of reg-
ulatory problems, which may involve restrictions on speech, may be
treated as a form of "speech-related benefit," since the restriction of
speech may serve to advance a regulatory goal with perceived benefits
to the public. The judiciary has in hand the authority to apply this test,
but it is an act of both power and restraint, since speech restrictions may
be upheld to support the legislature, or its delegates, in their regulatory
activity.
IV. THE POLITICS OF ACTIVE LIBERTY
Breyer claims French political philosopher Benjamin Constant as
81. Id. at 541.
82. ACTIVE LIBERTY, supra note 8, at 41.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 49.
85. Id.
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his guide,86 but it is more what he leaves unsaid and undeveloped about
Constant's thoughts that illuminates the political features of his pro-
gram. According to Breyer, Constant emphasized the need for both pos-
itive (active) and negative liberty.87 However, Constant's lecture, The
Liberty of the Ancients Compared with that of the Moderns, on which
Breyer draws, is more weighted toward a warning about the limits of
active liberty.88 This is where the unacknowledged political implica-
tions of active liberty-and of Breyer's adaptation of it-begin to
appear.
Constant argued specifically that forms of liberty are determined by
forms of social organization.89 The active liberty of the ancient Greeks
did indeed entail direct collective deliberation about matters of state,
such as matters of war and peace.9" This was made possible by the
institution of slavery, which allowed slave-holding citizens to attend to
public rather than private affairs.9 Those citizens also accepted that
while they were guaranteed direct involvement and, therefore, control
over public life, they would have to accept regulation of private mat-
ters. 92 "As a citizen," Constant wrote, "he decided on peace and war; as
a private individual, he was constrained, watched and repressed in all his
movements. 93
Large modem nation-states, preoccupied with the pursuit of com-
mercial advantage, necessarily produced a different form of citizenship.
Their larger size, the abolition of slavery (for the most part), and, more
specifically, the dominant pursuit of commerce all favored a citizenship
more indirectly involved in politics and less stringently restricted in their
private activities. 94 Active liberty was traded for the negative kind.
Constant concluded that "we can no longer enjoy the liberty of the
ancients, which consisted in an active and constant participation in col-
lective power. Our freedom must consist of peaceful enjoyment and pri-
vate independence."95 Constant did hope to preserve some part of the
advantages of active liberty, but such hopes appear only at the conclu-
sion of his essay, after some fair warning about the limits on active lib-
86. See Our Democratic Constitution, supra note 7, at 245.
87. Id.
88. See Benjamin Constant, The Liberty of the Ancients Compared with that of the Modems:
Speech Given at the Athenje Royal in Paris (1819), in POLITICAL WRITINGS 309 (Biancamaria
Fontana, ed. & trans., 1988).
89. Id. at 310.
90. Id. at 311.
91. Id. at 314.
92. Id. at 311-12.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 314-15.
95. Id. at 316.
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erty.9 6 Constant also made clear that any conception of liberty is
necessarily grounded in concrete social conditions, not, as Breyer would
have it, in the time-independent core of a written constitution.
Therefore, Constant's writings are not a completely rousing source
of encouragement for Breyer's proposed project of active liberty. More-
over, close attention to Constant's views highlights some of the political
implications of active liberty. For example, Isaiah Berlin, in Two Con-
cepts of Liberty, shows how a model of active liberty may come to
depend upon "the rule of experts."97 Active liberty holds out the prom-
ise of the citizen's democratic self-realization through a rational order-
ing of society-that is, through sound public policy. While negative
liberty is merely freedom from state-imposed constraints, the active kind
looks to sweep away the obstacles to the achievement of a better life. It
is "liberation by reason,"98 achieved through the exercise of State power
in the name of the public good.
Berlin had in mind, of course, the extreme totalitarian examples of
the tyranny of reason, but his analysis of the political implications of
active liberty need not be confined to those cases. Breyer has chosen to
argue his case within this line of thought, and it is not unfair-indeed it
would seem necessary-to consider whether his argument's politics are
vulnerable to a critique of roughly the same kind.
V. CONCLUDING COMMENTS ON THE NATURE OF BREYER'S THEORY
OF DEFERENCE
Breyer's theory of active liberty is a vision of democratic politics
and governance. However, it is also a theory of constitutional judging
that invites scrutiny of its political assumptions and of its implications
for different views about democratic participation.
First, active liberty allows the Court to be too deferential to legisla-
tures. It is telling that Breyer suggests that active liberty is consistent
both with judicial modesty and with judicial power. In effect, under
Breyer's conception of active liberty, the Court can exercise deference
that goes beyond the boundaries that were once clearly established by
First Amendment jurisprudence. As Breyer's analysis demonstrates, the
concept of active liberty allows the Court to group political regulatory
problems with those presented by environmental, consumer product, and
workplace regulation. Breyer has lauded Justice Brandeis for "urging
96. Id. at 327.
97. ISAIAH BERLIN, Two CONCEPTS OF LIBERTY: AN INAUGURAL LECTURE DELIVERED
BEFORE THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD ON 31 OCTOBER, 1958 (Clarendon Press 1961) reprinted in
FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118, 152 (1969).
98. Id. at 144.
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deference to legislative judgments, when economic legislation and ordi-
nary social legislation is at issue." 99 However, Breyer has gone a step
farther by offering, through active liberty, the theoretical basis for still
more deference when the legislation is political in character. This
entrusts to the State considerable power over political speech and
activity.
Second, while deference requires reliance on expertise, it is not
obvious how Breyer actually defines the term "expertise" in attributing
to the legislature a special capacity in political matters. Expertise gener-
ally connotes the dispassionate acquisition and use of special analytic
skills. We expect the application of expertise without the contamination
of self-interest. A hypochondriac with a strong interest in medicine has
much to say about his body, and he is familiar with his aches and pains,
the diagnoses made, and the treatment received. He may even be correct
about the ailment or the treatment. However, this is not to say that he is
an expert. The hypochondriac's profound interest in his health and
familiarity with his care does not constitute expertise or supply any part
of what is needed for it. Similarly, in reviewing campaign finance or
other political regulation, the Court may say with full conviction that it
will both credit the legislature with expertise and keep an eye on the
legislature's self-interest; however, it is unclear how expertise can be
claimed when self-interest calls that very claim into question.
Third, as a related point, it is curious that in other writings, particu-
larly Breaking the Vicious Circle, Breyer expresses distrust about ill-
considered legislative responses to ill-informed public demands, but in
the treatment of campaign finance regulation, he is prepared to look the
other way, to defer. Those defending extensive campaign finance regu-
lation argue that Congress must impose stringent and extensive controls
on political activity to placate a public troubled by the appearance of
corruption. This too has created a "vicious circle" of public demand met
with congressional action, followed by administrative agency programs,
which are widely derided by the press, thereby fueling still more discon-
tent and further demands on the legislature. It is not clear why this cir-
cle is any less "vicious." To the contrary, to the degree that it disrupts
the conduct of politics and poisons public perception of its legitimacy,
this kind of cycle seems even more "vicious."
Fourth, Breyer assumes that active liberty, when wielded by judges,
will foster informed discussion in which all citizens will participate and
exchange ideas and information. According to Breyer, active liberty
moves politics toward the type of rational government that he strongly
favors. Breyer apparently does not doubt the capacity and willingness of
99. Justice Brandeis as Legal Seer, supra note 39, at 719.
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citizens to engage in political life on the terms he proposes, believing
that "[t]oday's workers manipulate information, not wood or metal.""°
He expects that this form of politics is inclusive and is therefore also
broadly democratic. However, this is only one view, and it may not
appeal to those who do not believe that they can participate on equal or
effective terms in an informed conversation directed by experts. Some
Americans would prefer a politics pursued through organized mobiliza-
tion and believe that they would be better served by arguing about inter-
ests rather than policies. When these arguments become a conversation,
and rational public policy becomes the topic, they may feel that they are
losing their voice-or just losing.
Finally, Breyer seems convinced that democracy is closely tied to
workability. According to Breyer, institutions are more democratic in
proportion to their capacity for effective action. To support this point,
he makes claims about the early American experience, suggesting that
we learned that democratic responsiveness had to be tempered with a
concern for functionality.10 1 Regardless of whether Breyer's historical
analysis will command wide agreement, there are problems with his
insistence that speech and association for political purposes are tolerable
as long as they promote effective government problem-solving. To sus-
tain a theory built on deference to the legislature, Breyer must ignore the
question of who defines the types of problems that require the suppres-
sion of speech and association in the interests of a solution. This is not
merely a problem of incumbent self-interest as Breyer seems to believe;
rather, the problem goes deeper, as officeholders acting with the highest
motives may feel justified in exercising powers that actually limit the
space for free public speech and mobilization. The deference to the leg-
islature advocated by Breyer represents a degree of trust in the legisla-
tive expertise unmatched by either an appreciation of its potential abuse
or a feasible proposal for judicial monitoring and controls.
Thus, a major flaw in Breyer's notion of active liberty is the
assumption that government activism is not merely reconcilable with
liberty, but that true liberty, defined as democratic participation and
trust, is not possible without successful, activist government problem-
solving. Breyer does not accept or address the principal challenge,
which is to show how, in light of experience, we should be reassured
that liberty will not lose ground to activism. History, on which Breyer
hopes in part to build his argument, is not as helpful to his cause as he
would have us believe.
100. ACTIVE LIBERTY, supra note 8, at 40.
101. Id. at 24, 28.
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